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CANADA UPDATE: FEBRUARY 2011
THROUGH APRIL 2011 HIGHLIGHTS OF
SIGNIFICANT COURT CASEs ABROAD
Soji John*THIS update of the Canada Reporter will consider two cases, Bou
Malhab v. Diffusion Mitromidia CMR, Inc. and Ontario (Att'y
Gen.) v. Fraser. In Bou Malhab, the Supreme Court of Canada
found that the appellants had not proven their case for damages in a class
action suit for defamation. In its analysis, the court expounded on factors
to consider when analyzing the injury element in defamation suits. In
Fraser, the Supreme Court of Canada analyzed the constitutionality of
Ontario's Agricultural Employee's Protection Act, finding that it meets
the requirements of good faith and collective bargaining to preserve free-
dom of association under section 2(d) of the Charter of Human Rights
and Freedoms, supporting its decision in Health Services and Support-Fa-
cilities Subsector Bargaining Ass'n v. British Columbia. Fraser both clari-
fies the court's understanding of Health Services and exemplifies some
remaining contentions.
I. BOU MALHAB V. DIFFUSION MtTROMADIA CMR,
INC.-DIFFICULTY IN PROVING INJURY FROM
DEFAMATION WITH A DIVERSE CLASS
Almost a decade after Montreal cab drivers were verbally assailed on
public radio, the Supreme Court of Canada found that Bou Malhab, the
lead plaintiff in a class action defamation suit brought by Quebec taxi
drivers, had not shown that each member of the class had sustained an
injury and, as a result, was not entitled to class action damages.' In Bou
Malhab v. Diffusion Mgtromidia CMR, Inc., J. Deschamps, writing for
the majority, expounded on a non-exhaustive set of six factors to consider
*Juris Doctor, SMU Dedman School of Law 2011. This is Mr. John's last update as
Canada Reporter. He wishes to thank the editorial staff of the Law and Business
Review of the Americas, in particular Mr. Octavio Dominguez and Mr. Alexander
Farr. As he passes responsibility to Ms. Dorothy Tran, he wishes her the best of
luck.
1. Alysia Lau, Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Mdtromdia: SCC Finds "No Ordinary Per-
son" Would Believe Reputation of "Nigger"-Speaking Arab and Haitian Taxi Driv-
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in determining whether each individual member in the class had suffered
an injury.2 In its analysis, the court considered defamation, in particular,
the injury element, under Quebec civil law as well as in common law ju-
risdictions, such as England and Canada, finding that the ordinary person
standard is the appropriate gauge in analyzing injury.3 Under the set of
six factors, the court found that the plaintiffs had not proven a cognizable
injury and upheld the ruling of the appellate court, which overturned a
damage award at the trial level.4 Because of the similarity between civil
and common law jurisdictions, Bou Malhab becomes important in consid-
ering whether a plaintiff will be able to show sufficient injury for each
member of the class in order to seek damages, or if he would have a
better case by bringing an individual suit and joining distinct members.5
A. BACKGROUND
In November of 1988, Andr6 Arthur, a radio show host, made deroga-
tory comments against Montreal taxi drivers, particularly those of Arabic
and Haitian descent.6 These comments included statements such as,
"[TRANSLATION] Why is it that there are so many incompetent people
and that the language of work is Creole or Arabic in a city that's French
and English? . . . I'm not very good at speaking 'nigger' . . . [T]axis have
really become the Third World of public transportation in Montreal . .. "7
On behalf of Montreal taxi drivers whose "mother tongue is Arabic or
Creole," Mr. Bou Malhab, a taxi driver of Arabic descent brought a class
action suit for defamation against Diffusion M6tromddia, CMR Inc.,
which operated the radio station where Mr. Arthur hosted his show.8
The Superior Court, on remand from the appellate court and after origi-
nally refusing to certify a class, found Mr. Arthur's remarks to be "racist,
defamatory, and wrongful."9 The court granted damages of roughly
$CAD 200,000 payable to "a nonprofit organization representing taxi
drivers."10 The Quebec Court of Appeals overturned the verdict, finding
that the plaintiffs could not show individual injury required to obtain a
damage award."
2. Id.
3. Fares Bou Malhab v. Diffusion M6trom6dia, [2011] S.C.C. 9 $ 22-42 (Can.).
4. Id. 11 1-2, 94.
5. See Lau, supra note 1.
6. See Lau, supra note 1.
7. Bou Malhab, [2011] S.C.C. 9, $ 3.
8. Id. $ 2.
9. Hugh Tomlinson, Case Law: Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Metromedia CMR
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B. MAJORITY OPINION AT THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed the elements of defamation
under Quebec civil law, which requires a showing of "fault, injury, and a
causal connection" between the tWo.12 Because the respondents had con-
ceded fault, the court focused its analysis on the injury element.' 3 In par-
ticular, the majority emphasized the use of an objective standard in the
analysis of injury applicable "in both civil and common law systems."' 4
The court stressed that the analysis must consider not whether the plain-
tiffs considered themselves injured, but whether from the viewpoint of an
"ordinary person," the remarks by the defendant, "when viewed as a
whole, brought discredit on the reputation of the victim."' 5 Moreover,
the court indicated that regardless of whether a defamation charge is
brought as a class action or as an individual or joint action, the injury
element must be personally felt by all plaintiffs to the suit-as required
by the Code of Civil Procedure in bringing an action, the Quebec Charter
in protecting reputation as a personal right, and the Civil Code of Quebec
in compensating only personal injury.16
The majority proposed six factors to consider to assess whether the
plaintiffs were personally injured.' 7 These included: (1) "the size of the
group;" (2) "the nature of the group;" (3) "the plaintiff's relationship with
the group;" (4) "the real target of defamation;" (5) "the seriousness or
extravagance of the allegations;" (6) "the plausibility of the statements
and their tendency to be accepted;" and any "extrinsic factors."' 8 Most
notably, a large-sized group does not necessarily preclude showing injury;
although it is more difficult for "each member [to] feel affected" as size
increases, it is considered along with other factors, especially the nature
of the group.19 But as size increases, it is easier for a group to become
increasingly heterogeneous, such that "imputing a single characteristic to
all member[s] of ... [the group] .. . would make an allegation of personal
injury implausible." 2 0 As a further consideration, when the defamation
relates to the plaintiff's status within a group or when the plaintiff is a
well-known member within the group, it is easier to establish a personal
injury.21 The court also discussed that even when the true target of the
defamation is a subset of the group, if the ordinary person associates the
defamation with the entire group, the group as a whole could suffer in-
jury.22 But a diffused prejudice is insufficient; there must be a cognizable
12. Bou Malhab, [2011] S.C.C. 9, $ 22.
13. See generally Bou Malhab, [2011] S.C.C. 9, $ 9.
14. Tomlinson, supra note 9.
15. Bou Malhab, [2011] S.C.C. 9, 79 (emphasis added).
16. See id. $$ 45-47.
17. Tomlinson, supra note 9.
18. Id.
19. Bou Malhab, [2011] S.C.C. 9, 57, 62, 64.
20. See id. 1 66.
21. Id. 1 69-70.
22. Id. $ 72.
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injury to all members that form the class. 2 3
In considering the seriousness or extravagance of the statements and
the plausibility of the comments and their tendency to be accepted, the
court advised considering the statement made along with the speaker and
common perceptions of the group.24 As a statement becomes more ex-
travagant and the sincerity and objectivity of the speaker is in question,
the statement "will not be accepted by an ordinary person," leading to
little if any cognizable injury.25 Moreover, as comments become less
plausible, the ordinary person will be less likely to connect the comment
to an individual within the group.26 Finally, the court acknowledged that
extrinsic factors such as the medium in which the defamatory statement is
presented can affect the credibility of the statement and influence the
belief of the ordinary person, and so may play a role in assessing injury.27
Thus, the analysis of injury is significantly fact intensive. 2 8
In applying these factors, the court found that while the comments by
Mr. Arthur were racist and tended to "have a pernicious effect on the
opinions of members of its audience," the group is so large and heteroge-
neous that the characteristics of the members do not extrapolate to the
group; therefore, the disparagements made by Mr. Arthur would be re-
garded as "sensationalistic generalizations." 29 An ordinary person would
not change his opinion of an individual member of the group based on
such statements. 30 The majority felt that, not only was the size of the
group large, but it also lacked any structuralized or formalized associa-
tions and contained individualized members whose characteristics could
not be generalized.3' Furthermore, Mr. Arthur and his radio show were
well-known for broadcasting "satirized" and sensational content so that
"comments made by Mr. Arthur . . . have very little plausibility from the
point of view of an ordinary person." 3 2 For these reasons, the Supreme
Court of Canada affirmed the Appellate Court and found no injury to the
class. 33
C. DISSENTING OPINION
The dissent agreed with the majority's list of factors used to determine
whether there would be personal injury, but in applying them, the dissent
concluded that, in this case, there was sufficient, identifiable harm to war-
23. Karim Renno, Supreme Court of Canada Denies Taxi Drivers' Class Action
Against Radio Host, Ossi ii (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.osler.com/NewsResources/
Details.aspx?id=3259.
24. See Bou Malhab, [2011] S.C.C. 9, $1 73-77.
25. Id. 74.
26. Id. 1 76.
27. Id. 11 78-79.
28. See generally, id. 1 57-72.
29. Lau, supra note 1; Bou Malhab, [2011] S.C.C. 9, $ 82, 94.
30. Bou Malhab, [2011] S.C.C. 9, 1 92.
31. Id. 1 86.
32. Id. 1 89.
33. Id. 11 81, 92, 94.
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rant damages. 3 4 First, the dissent argued that the majority had given too
much credit to the "ordinary person," conferring him with the attributes
of an "ordinary third-year law student." 3 5 The dissent felt that an ordi-
nary person with a lower standard of discrimination would find that Mr.
Arthur's comments reflected on Arab and Haitian taxi drivers.36 The dis-
sent also contended that the "group was defined with sufficient precision
and the statements [were] specific enough to be harmful to the reputa-
tions of each of its members." 3 7 Finally, the dissent maintained that Mr.
Arthur's reputation as a provocateur would not result in a lack of credi-
bility to the ordinary person. 38
D. CONCLUSION
Bou Malhab v. Diffusion Metromdia CMR, Inc. furthers the analysis
of injury in defamation suits, especially when class action suits are
brought, and applies to both common and civil law jurisdictions. 39 In its
analysis, the majority provides a set of factors in an attempt to objectively
determine whether individuals in a group have been sufficiently and cog-
nizably harmed to warrant damages. But in this case, plaintiffs must be
careful when bringing a class action with a group that is large and hetero-
geneous since applying these factors may result in finding a lack of injury
when analyzed under the ordinary person standard.
II. ONTARIO (ATTORNEY GENERAL) V. FRASER-LIMITS TO
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The Supreme Court of Canada recently considered collective bargain-
ing for agricultural workers in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser.4 0
This lawsuit was originally brought before the Ontario Superior Court by
three agricultural workers, the United Food and Commercial Workers
Union ("UFCW"), and Michael Fraser, its director, on behalf of "workers
in Ontario seeking the right to unionize and bargain collectively." 4 1 The
Supreme Court of Canada found that Ontario's Agricultural Employee's
Protection Act, 2002 ("AEPA") did not violate section 2(d) of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("the Charter").42 In doing so, the
court followed its 2007 decision in Health Servs. & Support-Facilities Sub-
sector Bargaining Ass'n. v. British Columbia in which the court held that
34. Lau, supra note 1.
35. Bou Malhab, [2011] S.C.C. 9, $ 105.
36. Id. 108, 121.
37. Id. 119.
38. See id. 120.
39. See Renno, supra note 23.
40. See Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.C. 20 (Can.).
41. Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2006] 79 O.R.3d 219, $ 1 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.).
42. Fraser Decision Reveals Judicial Debate over Bargaining Rights, SGM LAw, (May,
4, 2011) http://www.sgmlaw.comlen/newsevents/SGMNewsDetail.cfm?ID=255.
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the AEPA provided sufficient protection because it impliedly required
the employees to act in good faith. 4 3
A. BACKGROUND
The UFCW, having a mandate from employees of Rol-Land Farms, a
mushroom factory in Ontario, attempted to collectively bargain with
management but were continuously rebuffed. 44 In response, the plaintiffs
brought suit in the Ontario Superior Court seeking a declaration that the
AEPA, enacted to protect the right of association for agricultural work-
ers, was invalid because it violated section 2(d) of the Charter for failing
to provide sufficient protection to collective bargaining.45 The Ontario
Superior Court relied heavily on Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General)
in which the Supreme Court of Canada supported the view that while the
Charter guarantees agricultural workers the freedom to unionize, it does
not guarantee the right to "full collective bargaining." 46 The superior
court concluded that the concern of the Supreme Court over the limited
ability of agricultural workers to organize in Dunmore, stemming from
their "low levels of skill and education, low status, and limited employ-
ment mobility," had been alleviated by the positive right to unionize
guaranteed by the AEPA. 4 7 The court also concluded that because col-
lective bargaining was not required and because the AEPA seemed to
meet the minimum requirements listed in Dunmore such as "freedom to
assemble, to participate in lawful activities of the association, and to
make representations, and the right to be free of interference, coercion,
and discrimination in the exercise of these freedoms," the AEPA was
valid under the Charter as interpreted by Dunmore.48
At the Court of Appeals of Ontario, the majority held that because the
right of collective bargaining was not protected, the AEPA breached sec-
tion 2(d) of the Charter.49 The court relied on Health Services along with
Dunmore to conclude that section 2(d) required protecting the right to
full collective bargaining.50 Under the Baier Test, because the appellants
were seeking section 2(d) protection for associational activities, and be-
cause the court concluded that their claims "were grounded in the funda-
mental freedom of association," the court found that "the AEPA
substantially interferes with section 2(d) . . . [by failing] to provide suffi-
cient protections to enable agricultural workers to engage in a meaningful
process of collective bargaining," and that the government was "responsi-
ble for the inability to exercise the right to collectively bargain," such that
43. Id.; see Health Servs. & Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass'n v. British
Columbia, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 1 2 (Can).
44. Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2008] 92 O.R.3d 481 19 1-2 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
45. Id. 9 29.
46. Fraser, [2006] 79 O.R.3d 219, 1 22.
47. Id. l1 21-23; see id. 1 18.
48. Fraser, [2008] 92 O.R.3d 481, T1 29-32.
49. Id. 1 36.
50. Id. 11 46, 52; Fraser, [2011] S.C.C. 20, $ 44.
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the government violated the appellants' Charter section 2(d) rights.5 '
Furthermore, because the violation was not justified under section 1 of
the Charter,52 the Court of Appeals for Ontario held that the AEPA was
unconstitutional, invalidated it, and ordered the government to "provide
agricultural workers with sufficient protections to enable them to exercise
their rights to bargain collectively."s 3
B. MAJORITY OPINION AT THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
The Supreme Court of Canada stressed that its previous holding in
Health Services is "grounded in precedent, consistent with Canadian val-
ues, consistent with Canada's international commitments, and consistent
with this Court's purposive and generous interpretation of other Charter
guarantees," and therefore should be upheld.54 The court held that the
Charter "s[ection] 2(d) protects . . . the right to associate to achieve collec-
tive goals," but does not guarantee any particular type of collective bar-
gaining.55 The Court emphasized that this did not require a full-blown
collective bargaining procedure as in the Labour Relations Act, 1948
("LRA") to protect the freedom of association of agricultural workers.5 6
But the majority also held that section 2(d) also provided for a right to
good faith bargaining in collective negotiations.57 The AEPA meets this
requirement because the employers have an implied duty to act in good
faith when representations of employees are presented; this is clear from
the purpose of the legislation and the intent of the legislators as pre-
sumed and expressed during debates.58 Finally, the majority emphasized
that although the Charter explicitly protects the individual right of associ-
ation, exercising this right "may require the protection of a group
activity."5 9
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that unlike Dunmore, the
AEPA did not make "meaningful association to achieve workplace goals
effectively impossible." 60 The court argued that any "ambiguity in [the
AEPA] should be resolved by interpreting [the statute] as imposing a
51. Fraser, [2008] 92 O.R.3d 481, 1 54-55, 59, 101; see generally id. § 5.
52. Charter section 1 allows for the abridgement of rights "to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic soci-
ety." Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, s. 1 (U.K.).
53. Fraser, [2008] 92 O.R.3d 481, 1 138.
54. Fraser, [2011] S.C.C. 20, T 97.
55. Id. 46.
56. Paul E. Broad, Supreme Court of Canada Considers Scope of Collective Bargaining
Rights, FTR Now (Apr. 29, 2011) http://www.hicksmorley.com/modules.php?name
=News&file=article&sid=937. The Labour Relations Act completely excluded ag-
ricultural workers from its protection for association and "substantially impeded
their capacity to exercise their freedom to organize." Fraser, [2008] 92 O.R.3d 481,
1 38. Dunmore required that this violated section 2(d) of the Charter. See Fraser,
[2008] 92 O.R.3d 481, 1 42.
57. Fraser, [2011] SCC 20, 9 51.
58. Id. 1 100-02.
59. Id. 1 64.
60. Id. T 98.
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duty on agricultural employers to consider employee representations in
good faith." 61 Furthermore, because the plaintiffs did not turn to the Ag-
ricultural, Food, and Rural Affairs Tribunal ("AFRA Tribunal"), which
has the power to enforce AEPA requirements, the majority agreed with
the trial court that it was premature to consider whether the AEPA in
application violated section 2(d) of the Charter.62 For these reasons, the
Supreme Court of Canada found the AEPA to be in compliance with the
Charter. Also, because the AEPA had not been properly tested, al-
though the position of agricultural workers remained vulnerable, as was
the situation in Dunmore, the court found the appellants' claims of their
violation to the right of equality under section 15 of the Charter to be
premature. 63
C. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
While the majority upheld Health Services, J. Rothstein in a concurring
opinion argued that the Charter section 2(d) does not protect collective
bargaining and to that extent, the court should overrule Health Services.64
J. Rothstein's concurrence regarded the protection of collective bargain-
ing as unworkable and considered that Health Services was criticized by
academics; however, most importantly, the concurrence argued that
Health Services strayed from precedent by requiring positive action by
the government to assist in "collective goals" rather than simply preserv-
ing freedom of association.65 Thus, J. Rothstein asserted that there is not
a duty of good faith or a right to collective bargaining imposed on the
AEPA.66 Similarly, J. Deschamp's concurrence found that the AEPA is
constitutional but argued that there is only a limited constitutional right
to collective bargaining, protecting the right of association and the pro-
cess of associating but holding that the requirement for good faith bar-
gaining is not required per Dunmore, the basis for enacting AEPA. 67
The dissent, on the other hand, did not find that the AEPA provided
sufficient protection for collective bargaining and, for that reason, argued
that the statute was unconstitutional. 68 The dissent argued that Health
Services imposes a duty on employers and employees to negotiate in good
faith and requires a right to collective bargaining.69 Because the AEPA
legislative history explicitly eschewed collective bargaining and because
there is no "statutory enforcement mechanism," as the AFRA Tribunal
was not granted authority to enforce good faith bargaining, the dissent
61. Id. 1 102.
62. Id. 19 109-12.
63. Id. 19 114-16.
64. See id. 9 128.
65. Id. 9$ 152, 166, 173-75, 190.
66. Id. 9 276.
67. Id. 911 308-10.
68. Id. 9 322.
69. Id. 9 326.
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argued that the AEPA violated the current understanding of section
2(d). 70
D. CONCLUSION
The majority held that the AEPA did not violate section 2(d) of the
Charter "because it provided a meaningful exercise of the right of associ-
ation and a tribunal for dispute resolution." 7^ The concurring opinions
indicate that the interpretation of Health Services, at least in terms of the
requirement of collective bargaining, is in question.72 Although the ma-
jority supported Health Services, they limited the extent of bargaining
rights to those constitutionally required. 73
70. Id. 1$ 332, 340-41.
71. Posting of Omar Ha-Redeye to SLAW, SCC Decision in Fraser v. Ontario, http://
www.slaw.ca/2011/04/29/scc-decision-in-fraser-v-ontario/ (Apr. 29, 2011).
72. Id.
73. Broad, supra note 56.
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